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R. J. Kaufmann
The Knowledge of Violence
"1 have one gift. 1 don't understand words."

Beggar in Giraudaux's Electra. :

Noone overturns a really fundam~_1
tal word or a concept by being clever-or by trying to be. Still, I think I
our confused and disturbing interval of history is very inaccurately
described if we call it an "age of violence." It is even conceivable that
what is happening to us is very nearly opposite to what this rubric in- I
vites us to suppose. One of our psychological losses can be detected in
our blurring of violence's clean lines. Most of the basic actions in which
violence unadulterated and of sound historical pedigree have been
plainly evident are being denatured. Sophistication of this familiar
product of human frustration joins innumerable other sophistications
of stimuli and response to give a special flavor-and a disturbing one
-to our emotionally intricate epoch.
Violence over history's ~urse has derived its central meaning
from the root affiliation of the term "violence" to the notion of violation of what is sacred-sacrilege, outrage and profanation are at its
core. Rape is its first obligatory exercise, and rape, for all its secondary
resonance, is a very personal and intimate act. In its purest form rape
is a unilateral assault upon innocence; it is always the forcible denial
of the independent reality and variously authorized private sanctity of
another being. Rape is not rightly so named without antecedent creditirig of something more than mere social status. Violence in its pristine form is an act of ontological invasion; it is one being acting upon
another being. Unless someone or some place or some object is
preinvested with sacred meaning, rape degenerates into a pathological
THERE IS NO NEED FOR PARADOX.
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faux pas. Violence loses its spiritual focus as soon as we erase socially
suffusing notions of life's intrinsic sanctity.
It is true that usage has extended the notion of "violation" throughout the long evolution of human aggression. Intimate, sexual assault
•
has provided a vivid format for many analogous descriptions of man's
abusive treatment of persons and objects. A gigantic catalog of typical
fractional displacements of this primitive form of physical assault has
been incorporated into legal codes. It is possible to read such codes,
from Hammurabi's and the Mosaic one onward, as typologies of recurrent displacements. Those sophisticated'identification guides, me, dieval Christian Penitential Manuals, record in punctilious detail ~e
exact quantum of spiritual aberration represented by each unwarranted
act of the aggressive sinner. An equally precise penitential exaction is
matched to the act. Violence historically has been performed against
something and not merely as a form of unilateral explosion from someone. Since this sounds like the most tiresome kind of pseudo-profundity-obvious where it isn't-opaque-we should try a counterinstance
by speaking of the pathos of violence without shapely consequences.
Like most psychologically imperial terms, violence is not easy to
describe. In fact, one of the easiest ways to describe the mastpr type
of contemporary personality is to say that it is feeble and awkard as a
violent agent.
We have superior devices for killing people. But beyond sheer increase in the scale of destructive efficiency, these instruments have
subtracted from rather than added to our personal experiences of violence. Long ago George Orwell discerned the cordon of immunity
which our rationalized technologies of language have placed between
us and the expen'ential facts of violence. When creatn¥es
ar "liquidated" and victims are recorded as "casualties," we begin to se imaginative affiliation with visualized actions. It is hard to
at what
point in the cycle of information processing to locate t. e act' with
inteIJt to delude. The crass political psychology which attributes such
denaturing of murder-as-experience solely to hard-eyed cynics intent
on deluding the public is superficial in the same way that anticlerical
philosophes of the eighteenth century were superficial when they devised a simple "conspiracy theory" to explain ~rganized religion. In
neither instance can the general run of humanity be exonerated from
acomplicity compounded of psychological needs and the susceptibili-
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ties of ignorance. The defensive mechanism called "denial" by psy.
chologists operates in the public as well as in the private sphere. Just
where is it that contemporary man is losing access to spiritually relevant social information?
The dialectical interplay of compassion and alienation in the reasonably healthy individual can help to provide an answer. Seneca asserted that, "As a wise man grows older, he outgrows pity_" Freud, in
one of his most profound and fruitful books, Beyond the Pleasure
Principle, argued that "Protection against stimuli is almost a more
important function for the living organism than reception of stimuli."
Bertold Brecht established both in practice and in theoretical argument the devices he called V erfremdungsefIekts (i.e., alienation effects
or devices). He employed these to provoke a state of detached or impersonal contemplation of the action occurring on the stage. He
wanted to jam the conventional circuits whereby spectators made easy
romantic or fantasied identifications with characters who were other·
wise safely welded into the play's action. He rightly saw that such facile
identifications provided a contingent exercise of socially underemployed sentiments and emotions, while protecting the spectator from
the purposive involvement in·the issues which a fuller, more reflective
intellectual response might entail. What Brecht did was to analyze
those tactics of self-depolitioization and nonutilitarian emotional release which are packed away in the psychological exercise called "escapism." By breaking through the conventional covenant of mutual
immunity from new perception enjoyed by the playwright and his
actors on the one hand and by the audience on the other, he hoped
.to rehabilitate the sense of objective complicity in, and hence of responsibility for, institutionalized injustice. He destroyed the audience's
illusion of guiltless "otherness" from those who suffer~d and struggled
within the drama's action. He wanted to convert his audience into
judging agents who would extrapolate from his dramatically embodied
instances of typical suffering to their analogous situations in the world
of actual society. Great drama like his subverts conditioned immuni·
tie~ and usurps the unjustified and unproductive emotional freedom
of the individuals who make up the audience. For our purposes, he
tried, as in Mother Courage for example, to reconstitute knowledge
of violence as a large climate which is aggregated from many intimate
events. And, in doing so, he stressed the banality, the routinized trio
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viality, the heavy-smallness of violence in

action~

Like any good artist
he forced his audience past their unanalyzed and socially imposed
sentiments about war and rape and unreflective cruelty to that marriage of sensory exposure and consequential thinking which betokens
responsible experience. By alienating his audience from unearned and
merely "official sentiments" he hoped to represent to ·nerves staled in
an atmosphere of conditioned emotional ignorance the jagged actualities wInch constitute the raw data of social conviction.
From Brecht's lucid vantage point, men are drugged by the mindless emotion called "pity," a response that is transient, mildly titillating, centripetal, and finally socially sterile. Pity is a socially permissible sentiment; it is not a Brechtian virtue. As I said earlier, Seneca
argued that wise men outgrow pity. Pity may punish its host, but there
is nothing in pity itself which helps the pitiable victim. It is only when
other qualities are added to it that pity participates in the nobler transaction known as compassion. How does this bear on "violence" which
seems to be a mode of action, a climate of possibilities and a Wittgensteinian clan of related performances? Perhaps the question canRe
answered, but only if it can .first be established that violence is sOnlething worth knowing.
First, they are encapsulated in
their skins. Very vulnerable people are described as thin-skinned. Men
like Kafka or Strindberg, for example, are preternaturally suggestible
and have a genius for pain-reactions. We can describe them as "men
without skins" and be reasonably confident of being understood. As
Freud said, "protection against stimuli" is as imperative to life as responding to them. Tear away a patch of relatively dull and imperceptive exterior skin and the bombardment of the exposed, naked area by
. all those sources of stimulation which we normally ignore induces pain
so distracting that momentarily we ignore all other channels through
. which information from the outside world is being reported. We don
artificial skins against what, with typical human egocentricity, we reify
as "The Cold." Our bodily system is a masterpiece of concentric de; fenses against the aggression of stimuli. When we are finally dead, we
! are proof against all the stimuli that stimulate. A dead man enjoys immunity to stimulation: "nothing can touch him further." When we
l conduct an individual existence, we are the stewards of our receptors.
INDIVIriUAL MEN HAVE BOUNDARIES.
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One of Freud's great contributions to human self-knowledge was to
put us systematically in mind of how complex and extensive th~
stewardship is. We are not -only required to preserve our skins-in most
cultures a legal as well as a physical obligation-but, through culturally
directed repression, we are induced to establish boundaries which limit
self-access into many regions of our mental life as well. If our political
macro-world is marked by many frontiers to be crossed, if at all, only
with special permits, the same is true of the micro-terrain of our interior being. Those.who cannot "learn" to construct these interior
boundaries are confined-palpable physical boundaries are constructed
for them in prisons and asylums. ,No human agent has total self-access;
there are instinctual and emotional bonds confining him, and he is
a collaborator in imposing these restraints.
Some of the greatest literature records the historical incubation of
these restaints. In the Iliad, Achilles is the paradigm of destructive
violence; it is, after all, his "wrath" or vindictive anger· which is the
unbound element and dynamic novelty in the ritualized heroic culture
of the poem. Being unbound and deeply personal, this wrath breaks
the bounds of the dreamlike, ballet configurations of the battlefield.
There many men are killed, but "violence" can properly be used as an
adjective to describe these warriorS" behavior only as a kinetic term.
Their performances are restrained, and performed under many prec~e
sanctions. The psychological effect on the reader of t4ese secondary
combats has none of the emotional affects we associate with violence.
These combats have the gravity of a game, and even the phenomenology of expiri1t is stylized. It is only the deep infusion of personal
resentment on the part of the bereaved Achilles that sends the action,
like the flooding river through which the wrathful Achilles plunges to
" "murder" the helpless suppliant, Lykaon, surging wildly 0l1tside the
banks of accredited heroic decorum. And it is only after Achilles' superhuman powers of destructive physical assertion have breached all the
stiff rules of heroic conduct, that he himself can teach, while learnin~
the quality of self-restraint through compassionate perception of the
courage and dignity of the father of his wrath's prime victim, the aged
King Priam.
Violence is not the name for certain actions; it is the condition
which transforms those actions. Violence is a form of moral behavior·1
It is a sentilIl;ental projection to describe a lion overtaking and killing'
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azebra as an "act of violence." It is brutal, sudden, shocking, natural
or lamentable depending on your vantage point. But it violates nothing in its own situational context. The latter would have to be morally
transformed before the lion's action could become a moral event.
Our world lacks the
confident vocational dignity of those simple times, when killing appr~priat~ others. u~der w~ll-cogitated .circumstances seemed~,ough
to illummate eXIstence. It IS worth addmg that for all but a small'percentage of historical time, this did seem "enough" for those aristocratic few who could pry the time for such games from the problems
of bodily subsistence. The far from consistent record of our efforts to
civilize ourselves indicates that man has tried progressively to demote
physical assault (rapine and killing) from a dominant place in his scale
of values and entertainments. The historical record displays many
backslidings and considerable reluct~nce to implement this putative
moral design. It is probable that only the diffusion of the notion of
property and the possibility of extended social participation in that
institution has promoted any gradual demotion of physical assault as
the-most interesting application of human energies. It is even debatable whether we have yet discovered a sufficiently gratifying alternative. However, the relevant point here is that the introduction of
competing alternatives for value preeminence has steadily enlarged,
as a direct coefficient of this process, the content of the notion of violence.
As religion transformed itself from rude animistic intimations into
a more sophisticated regulative device, it introduced the notion of
sacramentally privileged individuals and locales. It made possible the
investment of humanly constructed buildings and fabricated objects
with the numinous virtues once confined to natural objects and
natural forces. It made possible various idolatries of person, artifact and
structure. It also fostered a new formula for violence, inconoclasm.
, Smashing icons as an act is nearly as graphic as rape, but it takes a
much more sophisticated environment and probably one far larger and
more urbanized to make it equivalently inviting as a form of aggressive
~ release. But it has the extra virtue of public visibility. When Alcibiades
1 and his hippie cohorts whacked the phalli off the sacred Hermes of the
1boundaries, their violent-violations afforded a more complex form of
CLEARLY WE DON'T LIVE IN THE HOMERIC WORLD.
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gratification than less highly developed cultures could provide, Some.
thing to be likened to the rape of a vestal virgin by a conditioned be.
liever. Violence seems to have as one of its attributes the experience
of partial belief, of belief that has partly slipped its traditional moor.
ings but which hasn't broken utkrly free.
There are exceptions, but the significantly violent person in history
is one who has been infected with an attitude of acquiescence in his
formative years which he can neither tolerate nor expunge in his adult
years. His violently enacted mature mission is hence directed as much
towards effecting the hopeless liberation of his residual self as it is
~owards the political and social restrictions which provide exterior
analogies for this internal sense of the violation of his spiritual privacy
in childhood. Speculatively, one could say that some of the violence of
fanatical Protestantism arises from deeply ambivalent feelings about
the absolutely unjust nature of any sort of "works" whatsoever. Not
only are we not to be "justified" theologically by our "works" in can·
tradistinction to our faith, but all· human actions which purport to be
self-justifying instances of "works" of goodness are seen as forms of
moral tyranny, as if one had to say "I know what I aI!l doing and this
is for your own good. My goodness resides in enforcin~our goodness."
There is a sense in which radical Protestantism is absoiutely dedicated
to the prevention of this violation of pristine instinct. It moves towards
an atomistic conception of the private sours agon, forever renewed
throu~h
t
generations with no relevant human inheritance. It is
thus to ly ntihistorical.
Ye in another sense radical Protestantism stands diametrically opposite to this position. In embracing original sin also ambivalently it
demands the invasion of the infant self and a perpetual jealous surveil·
lance of adult pretentions to freedom of action thereafter. For by deny·
ing the theological pertinence of works, it makes necessary the most
minute enquiry into intention as opposed to performance. Thus tradi·
tional American Protestantism, in its more rigorous forms, has prac·
ticed an ethic of violation. Characteristically, it has answered the I
Biblical question, "Am I my brother's keeper?" with its own stringent
affirmative in which the stress falls on "keeper," so that human responsibility has been warped into a notion of baleful scrutiny of others lest
fugitive spiritual weakness harden into social deviation. It is not a very
long step from this puritanical deontology to the Ku Klux Klan or
i

I
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even to our officious attempts to prescribe the political options of the
Vietnamese. Violence is often a product of a curdled sense of spiritual .
responsibility for the opinions rather than the actions of others.

AQUICK INVENTORY of contemporary attempts at violence introduces
some puzzling factors. For example, tabloid journalism now has had
three full generations of British and American technical inventiveness
to amplify its skills. It has the stimulus of brutal competition and a
merciless sense of urgency to outdo yesterday's conditioned expectations for an audience whose tastes are presumably habituated to a
very special diet. The compound of innuendo, slanting, non sequitur,
quasi-slanderous imputation, trivialization, and the heady illusions of
voyeuristic access of these newspapers is too familiar to need any
spelling out. The long-term effect of tabloid journalism is dulling; its
self-imposed canons of extreme simplification quickly gut the most
vital issues. Its editorial policies general thump the grosser isms (pro
or con); its calculated intent is to induce confident judginents on all
issues or pseudo-issues. Its favored topics are sport, sex and violence.
There is also a heavy stress on the doings of the glamorous rich and
considerable scratching of the acquisitive itch. However, what is most
impressive about these tabloids is not what would be expected a
priori. It isn't their pernicious effect on morals, nor their immediate
banality, nor even their vulgarity. There are faint traces of these things
perhaps, but very faint. What impresses is their supreme quality as
nonconductors. They are like names writ in water. Nothing persists. It
is conceivable that a man whose mind was that tabula rasa, so appealing to old-fashioned philosophers, might formulate a model of the
I world from them faute de mieux, but even this is problematic~ What
you might achieve instead is a vague notion that there are a lot of
. blondes who are disaster prone, that violence is like fireworks in being
I, evanescently noticeable but of no resonant consequence, and that the
I pennant race in one sport or another has the comforting cyclic reguf larity of the stars in their eternal courses. Season follows season and
[ the more things change, the more they are the same. Probably a few
teetering psychopaths discover cues to or' recipes for violence they
I might have had to encounter elsewhere. Yet if these childish producI tions do specific harm, it is because they may prevent growth that could
! OCcur if they did not provide such a convenient substitute for other

I
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more full-bodied alternatives. But I think we should be suspicious of
anyone who describes these journals as violent or inflammatory or as
organs of any kind of purposive behavior, violent or otherwise. They
are sedative, like Marx believed religion to be. That lovable elderly
fiction, the intelligent man from Mars, if he studied a large sampling
of this public literature, would be little wiser than before about sociopolitical actualities; but I believe, were he suitably acute, he would
form some unflatteringly accurate opinions of the ordinary citizen of '
our time. He might. infer that he is mildly incoherent, parochial, at· .
tached to sustaining folkways, content to take his violence at second·
hand, systematically incurious about what used to be called first
causes, casually sentimental, and mainly loyal to what he knows..
Pseudo-violence is not violence, and sublimation of aggressive curiosi·
ties by habits lazy and vicarious represents no way of "funding" social
violence. Violence seems to require an antecedent emotional con·
gestion, a kind of choking monomania, before it can assume impressive .
proportions. Tabloid journalism, by its perpetual disjunctions of whole'
experience, seems to be a counteragent not a propaedeutic to violence. ;
As for the tarted-up Edwardianism of the James Bond world, with
its sexually maimed females awaiting the healing fierceness of oo7's
post-missionary virility, it pleasantly' caricatures itself. Its pneumatic
supergirls, "nasty'~ villains, campish decor and catalogue raisonne .
iterations of perfect meals, perfect scents, perfect potations, and per·
fect accoutrements owe more to the indolent greed of passive oral ;
longings than to such relatively well-organized emotions as lust and'
homicidal intent. The terminus of most emotions released by Bond·
ian capers is self-abuse in both its literal and figurative variations, .
Even as pornography it is unthreateningly adolescent. At worse, ih
faggot is added to the fire where the "reality principle" is burned at
the contemporary stake. Violence as a disciplined capacity is weakened <
by easy access to predigested triumphs. The fantas'y-stoked ethos of
Bondism probably increases our failure to react to violence with .
effective moral concentration; it does not provoke us to it. Like thetabloid, comic-book world it partly derives from, it is a cultural specific
against the synthesis. of purposive discontent. . '
When we shift our attention to the racial riots of recent years we ~.
move, but only partly, to a different plane of reality. It would be,
Panglossian folly to deny the potentialities for significant violence in
j

i

,j
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this sphere. I see that people have been killed, buildings burned,
passions inflamed, peaceful relations disturbed. It is categorically im~
portant to take what has been going on in Los Angeles, Cleveland,
Newark, Detroit and a dozen other places very seriously. Massive in~
justice has been done, is being done. Those of us who are middle~
aged will not see the necessary acts of social purgation and restitution
completed in our lifetime. I ~ is certain to get worse before it gets
better. What I have to say about these events and their relationship
to efficient violence should not be interpreted as an attempt to explain away, belittle the importance of, or to justify the status quo ante
which helped to nurture these riots.
Yet what is remarkable about these outbreaks is their comparative
restraint, their tentativeness, their brevity, their strangely selective
programs for destruction. If one compares the worst of them, the 1967
Detroit one, to, say, the forgotten Bristol riots of 1831, it is the
Bristol riot which was far more violent and sociologically pointed.
There the physical symbols of asymmetrical justice and social intimidation were directly assaulted: the prisons w~re taken and prisoners
released, the Bishop's Palace, the Mansion House, the Customs House
were demolished. Casualties mounted into the hundreds, and fifty
people were arrested on capital charges, along with many others
on lesser charges. And Bristol was then tiny by contemporary American standards. Contemporary America has yet to see any "Bastille
gesture." Despite the dangerous rhetoric of the Black Power movement, there is little evidence that it has the thing it proclaims, real
power.
D.H. Lawrence once said, speaking of understanding books, "Trust
the tale not the teller." This can be applied to historical events equally
well. If we look directly at these recent riots and not at the editorial
rhetoric surrounding them, there are some common denominators.
What violence there has been signally lacks revolutionary extension.
Those who live in the suburban rings around the inner city have
experienced almost nothing, while the riots have been going on a few
miles away, that they could not have experienced if the riot had occurred in a sister city two hundred or a thousand miles away. The anger
of the rioters has been largely directed against their hated immediate
environment, their ghetto as a physical entity, and against their designated legal chaperones, the police. There have been few sorties beyond
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sociological boundaries. The resultant inconveniences of their destruc.
tive action have penalized their friends and neighbors more than any
of those who have the power to alter their wretched state or who might
be analyticany singled out as their oppressors. It is more like a child
harming himself as a form of punishment of and appeal to anegedly
canous parents than a showdown between enemies. Or, to change the
figure, these efforts at significant violence have the pathos of the bull
in the Spanish arena, after he has been tormented and distracted by
the supporting cast. He is almost immobilized by doubt; he grows
alternately hesitant and desperate. He cannot identify his enemy and
the arena shrinks to a tomb. At that moment one feels the brave bull
might commit suicide were it within his capacity to do so. The
matador who closes .with him becomes, by his very definiteness as an
adversary, ahnost a savior. Blessed are those that find their enemy,
for they shan be confronted. Successful exercise of violence requires
conviction. Conviction stems from knowledge. The requisite know·
ledge is discovering the proper enemy. Sustained violence requires an
ideology, which is to say a persuasive set of notions for identifying the
enemy.
I think that Negro capacities for violence win increase in exact
ratio to education. We must and we win educate them better, and
we wiIl pay, as we should pay, the cost in a more coherent violence,
until a genuine mutuality born of a season~d respect for each others
human qualities restores communication and makes violence, which
is a substitute language, obsolete. Substantial equality, as opposed to
theoretical equality, rests on people having commensurate amounts to
lose by violence. The time when that win be true cannot come very
soon. Education wiII organize deep and formless resentments into a
program for a~tion, and part of that action win be violent. There are
ways partly to forestan these expressions. I hope we win discover the
generosity and inteIIigence to implement these ways. But it seems to
me unlikely we win graduate promptly enough from our "Tory Rad·
ical" program of escalated concessions, made in response to escalating
attempts at violence, to forestan many further expressions of this slowly
organizing knowledge of the technology of violence. Our intervention
in Vietnam, with all its lateral damage to our public morale, makes
early enlightenment in the civil rights sphere even less likely. There
is a problem of enemy-identification in the Vietnam crisis as wen.
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ARISTOTLE in his Poetics introduced the tenn hamartia, employing it
in his analysis of the tragic situation; so there is ready justification for
applying it to Vietnam. He was concerned to isolate just what it was
that catalyzed disaster in some sequences of events when this did not
occur in others. Hamartia, his term for this tragic catalyst, was long
translated as "tragic flaw," which translation carried with it a moralistic
judgment that tragic consequences were either the result of reprehensible character or of a fated (we might say "genetic") detenninism.
Modem research has indicated that "misindentification" may be the
more precise translation of hamartia. This has opened a far richer
world of tragic connotation, for it frees the term from either" shallow
moralism or rigid fatality. The protagonist in any action can "misidentify": his enemy, his cause, as even, more radically, he can misidentify his own nature, so that his energetic assertions are thrown into
opposition with his moral needs or his better interests. The greatest
Greek plays, Oedipus Rex, the Oresteia, and The Bacchae/.. disclose
new depth when read in this light.
The hamartia of the United States aS~hetically well-intended
protagonist in Vietnam is a tragic instance of such misidentification.
It is very hard to convince thinking men t at the workaday Viet Cong
member is an enemy of the moral or geopolitical interests of America
or of the community of nations. It is only slightly less difficult" to see
threatening spectres in the beleaguered and impoverished leaders in
Hanoi. Since Stalin died, it has been reasonably clear that a gradual
rapprochement between the Soviet Union and the U.S.A. was the
most likely course of events. It ~akes a steadily larger input of hysterical
editorial bullying to flag the average imagination into orthodox apprehensions of an international communist conspiracy. Even opportunists
of the middle-Right are a bit shamefaced about their part in this
litany. I think there is an almost endemic longing for apolitical figure
wise, prestigious and brave enough to declare the emperor naked. To
say that "the communist conspiracy" is a stale and obsolescent fiction
is not to say that machtpolotik is dead. The millenaium when men
will look at eaclu;ther with clear eyes, and lions and lambs, hawks and
doves ~ will fraternize is not upon us. But our specific violence is
chartered under the misidentification of Russian readings of their own
advantages. It is almost as if we were told, "Better that enemy than
none." Our country is doing the worst things being done by any
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major sovereign state at the present time. For most of the years after
1945 this was simply not so, and European left-wing doctrinaires .
were fatuous when they vehemently claimed knowledge of our na.
tional viciousness or equated us with the Russians. Now it is almost
as if we were retrospectively justifying that Cold War rhetorical
flimflam.
I believe our misapplied efforts in Vietnam (to give them no worse
name) stem from a frantic belief in the necessity of access. It is as if
1947 and 1948 with their articulation of the Truman Doctrine of Con·
tainment were theological benchmarks. We conceded the de facto
boundaries of the USSR's postwar consolidation of Eastern and Cen·
tral Europe. China represents a huge, extralegal, extrasystematic anom·
aly which we neither ignore nor recognize. The rest of the world is either .
healthily accessible to us, or it must be accounted politically ill. The
policy isn't wholly different from the British free-trade diplomatic
ethic which evolved in the early nineteenth century under Castlereagh I
and Palmerston. It might be described as the Doctrine of Imperial
Roman Citizenship Revived. Its creed runs that since we know our I
own m6tiv'es to be enlightened, and since we travel only to spread the
blessings of'-our technological culture, only those who have' sinister
designs and something to hide can possibly wish to deny us access. The
degree to which self-preservation and self-aggrandizement warp these
sincere, if unilateral and psychologically shallow, sentiments is quite
invisible to most communicants of this creed. Few want to deny tha~
in our flawed, sublunary world, strategic schemes for national defense
will be necessary for long years to come. To affirm this melancholy
truth is not to say that any material instance of "defensive military
activity" necessarily falls under this heading. There is no "knowledge"
(as opposed to expertise) in our attempt to apply violence in Vietnam. I
Its misidentifications are legion and not least in our hubristic notion I
that we can carry on this adulterous affair without its harming the'
quality of our national life.
Violence is an attitude towards problem-solving, and it' both reo
quires and fosters a pernicious brand of ontological contempt. Our
newspapers use degrading figures to report the killing of .Viet Cong:
.Marines "bag" sixty-three Cong as hunters "bag" their lithit. General
Kitchener, the leading British military figure at th~. dawn of our epoch,
solved the worrisome problem of Boer guerilla harCl$sment by system-
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aticalIy fencing off areas and hunting down the Boers thus enclosed
like vermin. He straddled the eras of colonial hauteur and technical
expertise. He gave cues to the future. No amount of vaguely beneficent'
rhetoric can conceal our racial double standard. The Vietnamese are
pragmatically subhuman, expendably inferior. Confused violence feeds
on such defects of moral imagination-it leads to ignorant violation of
beings who are denied the ordinary quantum of human sanctity.
A measure of this contagion revealed itself during the instant~war
between Israel and the Arab States. The classic lucidity of the tactics
employed, the open terrain-like the models for war games-and the
quick, unequivocal nature of the outcome roused something like
nostalgia for lost innocence. Hardly anyone questioned this use of
planned violence. The very shapeliness of the applied violence seemed
to provide its natural justification. At least for a while vi01ence seemed
once again to be linked to specific causes and to be directed toward
understood consequences. Violence seemed intelligible.
WHETHER THIS IS FINALLY SO IS NOT THE QUESTION. We live in a world
of warped efforts at violence, not in a violent age. We need to think
about. violence, for we no longer have a consistent and reliable experience of it. Our capacities for testing reality in the sector marked
"Violence" are enfeebled and wispy-fed by images for which no useful scale of valuation has yet been devised. We search about us in our
art, our recreation, our periodical press, .our televisionary mythology,
and our personal relationships for reliable paradigms of violence, but
still our judgment in this sector is undernourished by practice or
counsel. The dominant and possessing classes in American society
have removed themselves from the inner city. They live in the suburbs
which have rudimentary and out-moded laissez-faire governments, so
that, paradoxically, those with the most influence have largely disenfranchised themselves as positive political agents, exercising their priviliged role almost exclusively in terms of expensive immunities from
the areas where violence is incubating; and it is there that needful
knowledge can be born. By one of the supreme ironies of hiStory, the
most favor~d citizens of the richest and allegedly freest nation in
history are being sealed off from the use of the very cities which their
efforts have raised, much as they are sealed off from China or Eastern
Europe.
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Misspent violence is the logic of imperfect knowledge. It is used
against misidentified enemies when self-condemned ignorance pre.
vents the discovery of real enemies. Violence against Hitler owned
dignities denied our current exercises. Some of the courageous repudi.
ations by the younger generation of a place in this sordid script are
attempts to invent new dignities which, borrowing as little as possible
from past canons of behavior, indict the historical ignorance which
requisitions their lives.
It is my conviction that men, given any chance, do not condone
punishing forms of ignorance indefinitely-in themselves or in others.
Living as we do in an age which makes us accessories both before and
after the fact to unconsidereod and futile violations of human rights, we
are fortunate to this extent. There is much that must be learned
about violenc~This clear need to learn is a kind of historical blessing.
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